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A Quantitative Literacy View of Natural Disasters and Nuclear Facilities
Abstract
The March 11, 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster in Tohoku, Japan, highlights the need to
improve quantitative literacy (QL) in natural hazard assessment. A critical understanding of natural hazard
assessments requires a sophisticated perspective on the mathematical and statistical tools used to
estimate the odds of disaster, and the roles of data quality, model development, and subjective probability
in estimation of uncertainty. Thus, improved QL is a basic requirement for improved decision-making
about the safety of critical infrastructure, such as nuclear facilities.
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According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there are more
than 500 nuclear facilities operating on Earth today. If we sum the operating
periods of these nuclear reactors, we find they have operated for more than 13,000
reactor-years. Nuclear facilities are commonly located in areas where external
hazards from tropical cyclones, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and the like are
on the order of 10-4 to 10-5 per year. Given these numbers, we can react with
dismay and horror to the impacts of the March 11, 2011 earthquake and tsunami
on the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant, located in Tohoku, Japan, but we
should not be overly surprised. Probability dictates that such events are expected,
given the number of reactor-years already logged by this global industry.
Societies make decisions concerning public health and safety with a wide
range of complex and competing metrics in mind, even in the best of
circumstances. Are these decisions justified? To answer this, we need to
accurately calculate the odds of disasters and their expected impacts. Such
calculations are of course difficult and usually hampered by lack of precise
information about the recurrence rates of catastrophic events and the potential
magnitudes of these events. So, at its heart, assessment of natural hazards is an
issue in quantitative literacy (QL). The informed public needs to understand the
quantitative underpinnings of decisions. We need to understand the assumptions
and limitations of these calculations. Perhaps more importantly, scientists and the
public we serve need to understand the uncertainties inherent in calculating the
odds. Since we live on a tectonically active planet, and we are building extreme
technologies that carry the threat of regional, or perhaps global, impacts, we need
to hone quantitative tools to render informed decisions and to evaluate these
decisions.
Consider again the events of March 11. What was not expected following the
earthquake and tsunami in Tohoku, Japan, is that containment would fail and that
radionuclides would be released into the biosphere as a result of these external
impacts. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency dictates that, for U.S. nuclear
power plants, the probability of loss of containment due to such events should be
less than 10-7 per year. That is, the facility should withstand external impacts in all
but the rarest of circumstances. This is not a global standard. Indeed, a global
regulatory standard does not exist today, as the IAEA has no mandate to establish
regulations but only to issue guidelines on the safe siting of nuclear facilities.
Nevertheless, if we expect that nations such as Japan should adhere to the highest
safety standards then the consequences of the tsunami, direct release of
radionuclides into the biosphere, was unexpected and unacceptable.
Certainly the Japanese public wishes for high standards. Anti-nuclear
sentiment is higher in Japan than nearly anywhere else, largely due to their World
War II experience with atomic holocaust. Yet Japan relies on nuclear power more
than most nations, with 55 operating nuclear power plants and many more
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reactors. With few natural resources and high population density, Japan currently
has no viable alternative to meet its energy needs. At the same time (and it's no
geological accident), Japan is one of the most tectonically active nations on Earth.
Located on the Pacific Ring of Fire, Japan has a high density of volcanoes and
active faults. Consequently, Japan has invested heavily in monitoring the Earth.
They have the world’s best network of continuously operating global positioning
system stations, used for measuring millimetric movements of the Earth's crust.
They have dense networks of accelerometers and broadband seismometers.
Nowhere else on Earth is so much known about the scale of movement and
deformation of the crust than in Japan.
So how are they doing? Not well. Problems with external hazards in Japan's
nuclear program did not start with the Fukushima Dai-Ichi disaster, nor do they
seem likely to stop there. Consider the 2007 accident at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
nuclear power plant, the largest nuclear power plant on Earth, producing 8000
MW of electricity for metropolitan Tokyo. A 6.8-magnitude (Richter scale)
earthquake struck the area near this power plant in July, 2007. The geologic fault
that slipped, producing the earthquake, is located offshore and went undetected by
geologists and geophysicists prior to the earthquake. Although this accident was
much less serious than the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, it did result in a small
release of radiation into the Sea of Japan and shutdown of the nuclear power plant
at a cost of billions of U.S. dollars. Public confidence was justifiably shaken, as
analyses by geologists during the siting of this facility in the 1980s concluded
there was no risk of such an event.
The Fukushima Dai-Ichi story is eerily similar. During siting of this 6-reactor
nuclear power plant in the 1980s, earthquake and tsunami assessment
concentrated on the area immediately adjacent to the nuclear power plant site.
Large earthquakes (up to magnitude 8.3) were considered, originating where the
Pacific ocean plate is subducted off the east coast of northern Japan. Following
the Boxing Day tsunami of 2004, which killed approximately 240,000 people on
the rim of the Indian Ocean, the IAEA requested that the Tokyo Electric Power
Company reassess earthquake and tsunami hazards at their coastal nuclear
facilities, including the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant. This hazard
study was completed in 2007 and it was concluded that the maximum earthquake
they considered, again a magnitude 8.3, would produce a tsunami of
approximately 5.7 m height at the nuclear power plant site, and that a tsunami of
this magnitude would be blocked from impacting the site by existing tsunami
barriers – seawalls constructed in the 1980s. A report from the IAEA requested
that measures be taken to reinforce the power plant cooling system against
tsunami, but this request led to no change at the nuclear power plant site.
On March 11, the tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear power plant site
reached 10–14 m, inundated much of the site, and destroyed the back-up cooling
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system, resulting in 10s, perhaps 100s of billions of U.S. dollars in damage and
resulting in the catastrophic release of radiation. These events amplified the
disaster, which had already caused horrific loss of life, and greatly complicated
national and international relief efforts for survivors.
How can this happen? Both events, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa earthquake and
the Fukushima Dai-Ichi disaster following the tsunami illustrate the hubris of
deterministic analyses of natural hazards. At both of these nuclear power plant
sites, the worst case scenario was underestimated. It was assumed that difficult-todetect faults did not exist, and that the subduction zone would not trigger a
magnitude-9 earthquake. A hallmark of deterministic analyses is that they truncate
the tail of a distribution of potential events, either because it is convenient to
ignore this tail or insufficient data are collected to describe it. In both the
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa earthquake and the Fukushima Dai-Ichi tsunami, the
disastrous events that eventually occurred were beyond expectation. This is a sure
sign of inadequate hazard assessment.
Probabilistic methods applied to hazard assessment, of course, have their own
issues. Which probability model best describes the geological process, such as the
recurrence rate of hazardous events or their magnitudes? Are there enough data to
sufficiently bound recurrence rates of disastrous events? But a huge advantage of
probability distributions is that they have tails. If we use a Pareto or log-logistic
model to describe a process, then we have to admit that rare, extreme events are
possible, and we must plan accordingly.
What is the role of QL in improving our understanding of assessments of
natural hazards? One of the most confusing aspects of hazard analysis is the
possibility of very low probability events actually occurring. In daily life we are
accustomed to assessing the odds of disaster, but on the scale of 1:9 (probability
10-1), or 1:999 (probability 10-3). For example, if our lifetime odds of dying of
heart disease is 1:4, or of dying in a motorcycle accident is 1:999, many people
would intuitively regard such odds as “high” and take steps to mitigate their risk
of suffering these fates. The range of probabilities relevant in siting infrastructure,
like nuclear power plants, or assessing the safety of communities, is many orders
of magnitude less than these more tangible numbers. With this change in order of
magnitude, most of us lose our intuitive sense of “high” or “low” probabilities.
We need to be recalibrated.
Consider the following graph of the range of annual probability of hazards
associated with living near volcanoes (Fig. 1). The graph spans eight orders of
magnitude of annual probability. For some things, like roads or monitoring
instruments, annual probability of destruction in the range of 100 to 10-2 per year
is acceptable. If erupting volcanoes destroy these things we will rebuild them,
generally without much difficulty. For example, the southern Ring Road in
Iceland crosses areas prone to volcanic activity, and portions of this major road
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must be rebuilt every 10–20 years due to volcanic activity. On the other hand,
whole communities, hopefully, are not exposed to hazards of this order of
magnitude. Worldwide, many communities are exposed to hazards with annual
probabilities of 10-6 to 10-3 due to earthquakes, tsunami, volcanic activity and the
like. Generally, when probabilities are on the order of 10-3 per year or higher,
steps are taken to mitigate hazards. For example, communities have installed
debris-flow monitoring networks on the west slope of Mt. Rainer volcano,
Washington, in order to gain precious time to react in case of volcanic activity –
expected there with an annual probability on the order of 10-3. The range
associated with annual probability of destruction of communities by volcanoes
represents the variation in what is considered to be “acceptable risk” worldwide.

Figure 1. The range of annual probability associated with specific types of
infrastructure, communities and facilities. Orders of magnitude variation in
acceptable hazard rates occur depending on the type of infrastructure or
community considered. The lengths of the double arrows represent
variation, worldwide, in acceptable hazard rates.

On the other hand, critical facilities, such as nuclear power plants, can be
sited in the areas we choose, within limits, and so the acceptable hazard is yet
lower. In addition, it is widely acknowledged that destruction of such facilities
may have impact well beyond the immediate area, and so higher standards are
expected than are associated even with the potential destruction of communities.
In some regions, such as Japan, nuclear power plants are built where the
possibility of destruction by volcanoes is on the order of 10-5 per year, such as on
the island of Kyushu. In such circumstances, an annual probability of 10-5 might
be considered to be “high,” as the consequences of destruction of the site for
society are potentially so large. By these metrics, it is abundantly clear that the
probability of earthquake and tsunami impact on Fukushima Dai-Ichi was much
greater than is normally considered acceptable. Only the truncation of the
distribution by deterministic consideration of maximum anticipated events led to
siting of this facility on the east coast of Tohoku. For very long-lived facilities,
such as geological repositories of radioactive waste, annual probabilities of
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destruction on the order of 10-7 – 10-8 are often considered to be of concern.
If understanding the meaning of probability estimates is a challenge in QL,
understanding the data, models, and assumptions used to make these probabilistic
estimates is even more challenging to understand. In the 1960s, Allin Cornell
revolutionized the discipline of probabilistic seismic hazard assessment
assessme by
distinguishing between aaleatoric uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty (Cornell,
1968). Aleatoric uncertainty refers to the random variation
variations in natural systems
that make them impossible to predict. Because the rate and magnitudes of
earthquakes are not regular in time, we must develop statistical forecasts of these
phenomena. Easy enough. But Cor
Cornell also pointed out that we should evaluate
epistemic uncertainty as a separate issue. Epistemic uncertainty arises from
uncertainty about the validity of models we use. Is the distribution of hazardous
events best characterized by a Poisson model or a Paret
Pareto model? What is our
confidence in models of tsunami height, given the source magnitude and
mechanisms associated with a tsunami
tsunami-genic
genic earthquake? Such epistemic
uncertainty essentially makes forecasts of natural disasters more subjective.
How do we fold uuncertainty in models into our probabilistic hazard
assessments?? One method that is increasingly used in assessment of natural
hazards is to ask experts to weight models and data to develop a subjective
probability. For example, consider the graph in Figure 2. Eight experts, selected

Figure 2. Subjective probability of hazardous events can be estimated
using expert elicitation. Here eight experts were asked to estimate the
recurrence rate of volcanic activity for the region ab
about
out Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, the proposed site of a high
high-level radioactive waste repository.
The results, for each expert, are represented by the box and whisker plots.
The aggregate probability is thought to better represent the true
uncertainty of the haz
hazard estimate (from Coppersmith et al., 2009).

from a larger pool of scientists, were asked to assess the recurrence rate of
volcanic activity near Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the proposed site of a high-level
high
radioactive waste repository. Unfortunately, the site is located in an area of
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volcanic activity, meaning that there is a credible potential for new volcanoes to
erupt through a facility if it were built at Yucca Mountain. The eight experts
considered aleatoric uncertainty, for example the known timing of past volcanic
events in the region, and considered various models of volcanic activity. Perhaps
ironically, because the rate of volcanic activity in the region is low, there is also
considerable uncertainty about the rate. The probability assigned to recurrence
rates by each expert is represented by box and whiskers plots (Fig. 2). The idea of
such subjective probability estimates is that the aggregate probability, calculated
by combining the eight box and whisker plots, better represents the true
uncertainty in recurrence rate estimates for volcanism. Inspection of Figure 2 does
reveal that there is central tendency in the aggregate of the probabilities, with
most estimates falling between 10-5 and 10-6 per year. There also is tremendous
range, spanning about four orders of magnitude, in estimates of the recurrence
rate. This outcome is typical of subjective probability estimates and is thought to
reflect our true uncertainty.
Note that this analysis, although subjective, captures the long tail of the
distribution. This is a fundamental difference between probabilistic methods,
including the subjective probabilities estimated through expert elicitation, and
deterministic methods. In a deterministic assessment, experts might be called
upon to describe hazard scenarios for a site, or worse yet, to declare a site safe
from natural hazards or not. Such an approach results in the siting of facilities in
unsafe locations. Probabilistic assessment, with all its complexities and potential
pitfalls, offers a robust alternative, with experts relied upon to estimate parameter
distributions, assess the validity of models, and evaluate data in order to arrive at
an expected value of hazard and a thorough understanding of the uncertainties. A
quantitatively literate public should be able to distinguish between subjective
probability estimated through expert judgment and flawed deterministic
assessments. Arguably, our lives and our planet depend on it.
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